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Readability, Contracts of Recurring
Use, and the Problem of Ex Post
Judicial Governance of Health
Insurance Policies
John Aloysius Cogan Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
The recently enacted Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Actl and Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 20102
mark the most significant reform of the nation's health care
system since President Lyndon Johnson signed legislation
creating the Medicare and Medicaid programs in 1965.3 Although
efforts to overhaul the U.S. health care system have arisen
periodically since former President Theodore Roosevelt's Bull
Moose Party campaign of 1912,4 never have those efforts been
undertaken in a health care environment as complex as it is
today. Skyrocketing health care costs, advances in technology and
medical science, and increased pressure on consumers through
* John Aloysius Cogan Jr., Esq., is the Executive Counsel and Executive
Assistant for Program and Policy Review of the Rhode Island Office of the
Health Insurance Commissioner. Mr. Cogan is also an adjunct Professor at
the Roger Williams University School of Law. The author would like to
thank Mya Poe, Ph.D. for her invaluable assistance with this Article.
1. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
2. Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
3. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286
(July 30, 1965).
4. For a concise overview of health reform efforts in the United States
over the last century, see CATHERINE HOFFMAN, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE -A BRIEF HISTORY OF REFORM EFFORTS
IN THE U.S. (2009), available at
http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/7871.pdf.
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consumer-directed health plans 5 have created a health care
system that places a premium on consumer information. In the
months leading up to the passage of the new reform acts, political
dialogue and media coverage that focused on "health care reform"
typically referred to core issues such as cost, quality, and access to
care. Yet, the dialog rarely acknowledged a key problem-the fact
that most Americans do not understand their health insurance.
Simply put, consumers do not fully grasp their health insurance
coverage because the jargon found in many health insurance
5. It has long been recognized that health insurance creates additional
demand for health care. The additional consumption of health care
attributed to health insurance is referred to as "moral hazard," or the
additional health care that an insured consumer purchases, that would not
have been purchased if she had been insured. See John A. Nyman, American
Health Policy: Cracks in the Foundation, 32 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 759,
760 (2007) [hereinafter Nyman, American Health Policy]. According to
conventional wisdom, moral hazard is responsible for the significant increase
in health care expenditures. Joseph P. Newhouse, Medical Care Costs: How
Much Welfare Loss?, 6 J. EcON. PERSP. 3, 6-7 (1992). This view has, in turn,
created a "preoccupation" with moral hazard and a broad range of efforts to
reduce moral hazard through managed care strategies and the development
of consumer-driven health care. John A. Nyman, Consumer-Driven Health
Care: Moral Hazard, the Efficiency of Income Transfers, and Market Power,
13 CONN. INs. L.J. 1, 4-5 (2006). The effects of this theory and preoccupation
have been profound for consumers. Health insurance contracts are more
complicated to use. See Jessica Greene et al., Comprehension and Choice of a
Consumer-Directed Health Plan: An Experimental Study, 14 AM. J. MANAGED
CARE 369, 369, 374 (2008) (arguing that consumer-directed health plans are
more complex than other forms of health insurance and that consumers with
low-numeracy skills have greater difficulty making the type of cost-effective
medical care decisions that consumer-directed health plans were designed to
promote); Peter J. Cunningham et al., Do Consumers Know How Their Health
Plan Works?, 20 HEALTH AFF. 159, 163 (2001) (finding that less than one-
third of surveyed adults understood certain basic features of their health
plans related to network coverage, out-of-network coverage, primary care
physician requirements and specialist referrals). Moreover, increased use of
complex cost control and cost-sharing mechanisms (higher deductibles,
higher coinsurance, increased utilization reviews, etc.) burdens consumers
with increased health care costs. See Nyman, American Health Policy, supra.
The influence of the moral hazard theory has transformed health insurance
"from a solution into a problem," id. at 765 (citing Malcolm Gladwell, The
Moral Hazard Myth, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 29, 2005, at 44, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/printables/fact/050829fafact), and provided
intellectual support for the proliferation of health insurance policies that
focus on the reduction of moral hazard through cost control features and cost-
sharing mechanisms, and which have led to the current interest in consumer-
driven health care and health savings accounts. Id. at 761.
HEALTH INSURANCE POLICIES
contracts is impenetrable to most Americans. 6  This is
disconcerting because consumer-oriented information is central to
our increasingly consumer-directed health care system; consumers
are expected to make cost-effective choices among the array of
health insurance plans that may be available to them, utilize
health care services in a cost-effective manner, navigate provider
networks, minimize their out-of-pocket expenses, and effectively
appeal denials of coverage.
While the problem is especially acute for the elderly and low-
income populations,7 the complexity of health insurance
information challenges even those who read at the college level.
For example, a health insurance contract recently approved for
use in Rhode Island contains the following provision, part of a
"coordination of benefits" clause, which explains when the
insurance company will pay a claim if a child is also covered by a
second insurance policy:
The plan covering the patient as a dependent child of a
person whose date of birth occurs earlier in the calendar
6. See Cunningham, supra note 5 (finding that less than one-third of
surveyed adults understood certain basic features of their health plans
related to network coverage, out-of-network coverage, primary care physician
requirements and specialist referrals); Deborah W. Garnick et al., How Well
Do Americans Understand Their Health Coverage?, 12 HEALTH AFF. 204, 208
(1993) (finding that fewer than one-third of enrollees surveyed could correctly
answer basic questions about their coverage); Judith H. Hibbard et al., Can
Medicare Beneficiaries Make Informed Choices?, 17 HEALTH AFF. 181, 190-91
(1998) (finding that Medicare HMO enrollees have "less-than-adequate
knowledge" about their plans); David E. Nelson et al., What People Really
Know About Their Health Insurance: A Comparison of Information Obtained
From Individuals and Their Health Insurers, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 924, 926
(2000) (concluding that "individuals have a poor understanding of their
health insurance benefits"); see also Anna Wilde Mathews, The Importance of
Deciphering Your Insurance, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2009, at Dl, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124407903047283723.html (providing
examples of consumers confused by health insurance policies); Kerry Hall
Singe, No Insurance Against Confusion, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Oct. 25, 2009,
available at
http://www.actforasheville.comlnewsArticle.jsfdocumentld=8a785691248a48
cc01248b0ef92b0395 (noting that most consumer complaints filed with the
North Carolina Department of Insurance "stem from a consumer's
misunderstanding of their policy.").
7. See Jane Root & Sue Stableford, Easy-To-Read Consumer
Communications: A Missing Link in Medicaid Managed Care, 24 J. HEALTH
POL. POL'Y & L. 1, 2 (1999).
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year shall be primary over the plan covering the patient
as a dependent of a person whose date of birth occurs
later in the calendar year provided. However, in the case
of a dependent child of legally separated or divorced
parents, the plan covering the patient as a dependent of
the parent with legal custody, or as a dependent of the
custodial parent's spouse (i.e., stepparent), shall be
primary over the plan covering the patient as a
dependent of the parent without legal custody.8
Here is another example. This passage explains an insurance
company's right to recover the claims it pays:
In the event a third party, including your employer/agent,
is or may be responsible for causing an illness or injury
for which we provided any benefit or made any payment
to you, we shall succeed to your right of recovery against
such responsible party. This is our right of subrogation.
If you do not seek damages for your illness or injury, you
must permit us to initiate recovery on your behalf
(including the right to bring suit in your name).9
The language used in these provisions begs the obvious
question: Would the average Rhode Islander be able to read and
understand these passages? According to the Flesch-Kincaid
formula, 10 a commonly used measure of readability that estimates
the reading grade level of a document, the answer is no. On
average, Rhode Islanders, like most Americans, read at the eighth
grade level. Worse yet, forty-seven percent of Rhode Island's adult
population reads at the sixth grade level or below. 11 These
provisions are written at the twenty-fourth and thirteenth grade
levels, respectively.
When asked why health insurance policies are written with
such complex language, insurance companies, lawyers, or industry
insiders might give the following kinds of responses:
8. John Aloysius Cogan Jr., Op-Ed., Plain English is the Best Policy,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2009, at A24.
9. Id.
10. See infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
11. Rhode Island Addressing Illiteracy, PROVIDENCE J., July 17, 2005,
available at
http://www.projo.com/news/content/projo_20050717_1itside.232e346.html.
HEALTH INSURANCE POLICIES
"The contract is drafted for lawyers and judges. It
contains legal terms of art and passages already
construed through litigation. The language is therefore
necessary for uniform construction of the policy by the
courts."
"The average person does not read the contract, so it does
not matter if he or she understands it."
"All health insurance contracts contain the same or
similar language. They are designed for predictability by
the insurer, not for understandability by the insured."12
Such responses suggest that insurance companies and others
who control health insurance information are unaware of or
unwilling to acknowledge consumer needs. 13
The readability problem is not unique to Rhode Island.
Almost one quarter of the U.S. adult population is functionally
illiterate and an additional quarter has poor reading and
comprehension skills.14 Nearly half of the adult population has
deficiencies in reading and/or computational skills,15 and it is
widely acknowledged that, on average, the U.S. adult reading
12. These quotes are representative of comments that have been made to
the author by industry insiders and attorneys.
13. Certainly insurance companies are aware. The industry's leading
trade association, America's Health Insurance Plans, acknowledges that
"most Americans . .. only understand information written at an eighth-grade
level." Aileen Kantor, A New Level of Understanding, AMERICA's HEALTH INS.
PIANs, Nov. 2006, at 18, available at
http://www.ahip.org/content/default.aspx?bc=311 130 I 1361 182841 18285.
14. Donna M. D'Alessandro et al., The Readability of Pediatric Patient
Education Materials on the World Wide Web, 155 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS &
ADOLESCENT MED. 807, 807 (2001); Frank McClellan, Medical Malpractice
Law, Morality and the Culture Wars: A Critical Assessment of the Tort
Reform Movement, 27 J. LEGAL MED. 33, 45 (2006) (citing IRWIN S. KIRSCH ET
AL., ADULT LITERACY IN AMERICA: A FIRST LOOK AT THE RESULTS OF THE
NATIONAL ADULT LITERACY SURVEY, xiv-xvii (3d ed. 2002), available at
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs93/93275.pdf); David I. Shalowitz & Michael S. Wolf,
Shared Decision-Making and the Lower Literate Patient, 32 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 759, 759 (2004).
15. Ad Hoc Comm. on Health Literacy for the Council on Scientific
Affairs, Am. Med. Ass'n, Health Literacy: Report of the Council on Scientific
Affairs, 281 J. AM. MED. AsS'N 552, 552 (1999) [hereinafter Ad Hoc
Committee].
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level is eighth to ninth grade.16 In fact, studies suggest a large
percentage of Americans are unable to read and understand basic
health-related materials.17 Even for a consumer who possesses a
higher-than-average reading ability, a health insurance contract
may pose special problems. Complex financial information (i.e.,
the often intertwined cost-sharing information related to out-of-
pocket maximums, deductibles, coinsurance percentages, and
copayments), for example, can be difficult to locate in a consumer
contract. 18 The inability to fully comprehend one's health
insurance policy can lead to poorer overall health and higher
health care costs. 19
The expected responses above by insurance companies,
lawyers, and industry insiders are also at odds with classical
notions of contracts in which parties negotiate terms, reach a
"meeting of the minds," and then reduce the agreement to writing
in a document called a "contract." Yet, unlike standard contracts,
health insurance policies are contracts of adhesion. They contain
standard, non-negotiable terms and are drafted by insurance
companies that have little incentive to produce readable
documents. At first blush, a hard-to-read health insurance
contract may not seem to present greater problems for a consumer
than a hard-to-read automobile policy. But such is not the case.
16. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CREDIT CARDS: INCREASED
COMPLEXITY IN RATES AND FEES HEIGHTENS NEED FOR MORE EFFECTIVE
DISCLOSURE TO CONSUMERS, GAO-06-929, at 6 (2006), available at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d06929.pdf [hereinafter GAO CREDIT CARD REPORT];
Edgar Dale & Jeanne S. Chall, A Formula for Predicting Readability, 27
EDUC. RES. BULL. 11, 12 (1948); D'Alessandro, supra note 14; Root &
Stableford, supra note 7, at 5.
17. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE
HEALTH LITERACY OF AMERICA'S ADULTS, 6 fig.1-1, 10 (2006), available at
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2006/2006483.pdf (finding that only twelve percent of
adults had "proficient" health literacy, as demonstrated by the ability to
perform tasks like calculating an employee's share of health insurance costs
for a year, finding information required to define a medical term by searching
through a complex document, or determining which legal document is
applicable to a specific health care situation); Ad Hoc Committee, supra note
15, at 552-53.
18. Elizabeth Renuart & Diane E. Thompson, The Truth, The Whole
Truth, and Nothing but the Truth: Fulfilling the Promise of Truth in Lending,
25 YALE J. ON REG. 181, 208 (2008) (citing GAO CREDIT CARD REPORT, supra
note 16, at 49-50).
19. See Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 15, at 555.
HEALTH INSURANCE POLICIES
Unlike other types of insurance agreements, health insurance
policies are contracts of recurring use. That is, they are routinely
invoked by consumers who use their insurance agreements to
finance their health care.
Based on concerns arising from increasing consumer
responsibility for healthcare choices, the recognition that health
insurance policies are contracts of recurring use, and a steady
stream of consumer complaints about their health insurance
policies, the Rhode Island Office of the Health Insurance
Commissioner (OHIC) conducted its own investigation into the
readability of Rhode Island health insurance policies. A sample of
fifty-five health insurance policies, certificates of coverage, riders
and endorsements was drawn from filings made with the OHIC in
2007 and approved for use.20 The reading grade level of each
document in the sample was estimated using the Flesch-Kincaid
grade level formula, which provides an estimated reading grade
level of the document tested.21 The results painted a bleak picture
of the readability of health insurance contracts in the state. The
average Flesch-Kincaid formula score for the documents in the
sample was 15.45. In other words, the documents were, on
average, readable by someone who reads at the fifteenth grade
level-approximately a junior in college. The lowest score was
9.36 (readable by someone who reads at the ninth grade level) and
the highest was 30.4 (readable by someone who reads beyond the
graduate school level). Indeed, the findings suggested that
insurance documents written at the advanced college level were
the norm in the state, not the exception. Based on the results of
our study, we concluded that most health insurance policies in the
20. All commercial health insurance policies, certificates of coverage,
riders and endorsements that will be issued for use in Rhode Island must be
filed with the state and approved prior to use. Minimum Standards - Health
Benefit Plans, 2-30-23 R.I. CODE R. § 2 (Weil 2010), available at
http://www.dbr.state.ri.us/documents/rules/insurance/Refiled-
Regulation23.pdf. This rule was adopted by the R.I. Office of the Health
Insurance Commissioner (OHIC) on May 17, 2006. Adoption of Existing
Administrative and Health Insurance-Related Regulations of the Department
of Business Regulation, 2-31-1 R.I. CODE R. § 3 (Weil 2010), available at
http://www.ohic.ri.gov/RegulationlAdoptingDBRRegulations.php. Most
states require health insurance forms to be filed prior to use, though not all
require explicit approval prior to use. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH
LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 653 (6th ed. 2008).
21. See infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
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state were likely written at a level that far exceeded the reading
level of the average Rhode Island resident.22
This Article discusses the development and implementation of
the Standards for Readability of Health Insurance Forms,23 the
Rhode Island regulation that requires all health insurance
contracts to be written at the eighth grade reading level. Section I
provides a brief discussion on contracts of adhesion (the standard,
take-it-or-leave-it insurance policies), their long-standing history
of unreadability, how the courts have tried to address the
problems caused by contracts of adhesion, and the limitations of
those remedies. Section II discusses the unique nature of health
insurance contracts, why they are contracts of recurring use, and
why traditional notions of ex post judicial governance associated
with adhesion contracts are inadequate for health insurance
contracts. Finally, Section III describes the OHIC's efforts to find
and implement an ex ante solution to unreadable health insurance
contract: the eighth grade readability standard.
I. CONTRACTS OF ADHESION, UNREADABILITY, AND Ex POST
JUDICIAL GOVERNANCE
Contracts of adhesion are used for insurance, 24 consumer
loans, mortgage agreements, software and digital music
purchases, mobile phone service agreements, and just about any
other contractual arrangement we enter into today. 2 5 Contracts of
adhesion offer an insured no ability to negotiate the terms of the
deal, there is no "meeting of the minds," and the contract is simply
22. John Aloysius Cogan Jr., Preliminary Findings of an Investigation of
the Readability of Rhode Island Health Insurance Policies (Dec. 2008)
(unpublished study, on file with author).
23. Standards for Readability of Health Insurance Forms, 2-31-5 R.I.
CODE R. (Weil 2010), available at
http://www2.sec.state.ri.us/dar/regdocs/released/pdf/HICO/5768.pdf.
24. Jay M. Feinman, The Insurance Relationship as Relational Contract
and the "Fairly Debatable" Rule for First-Party Bad Faith, 46 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 553, 557 (2009) ("The insurance policy is a classic contract of
adhesion.").
25. Nearly forty years ago, Professor David Slawson observed that
ninety-five percent of all contracts we enter into are standard form contracts
of adhesion. See David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic
Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARv. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971). There is no
reason to think that the number has decreased in the intervening period.
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presented to the insured, who must either "take it or leave it."26
A. Health Insurance Contracts as Contracts of Adhesion
Health insurance contracts have historically been recognized
as contracts of adhesion.27 As such, the terms of health insurance
contracts are never fully discussed between the parties. In the
case of individual market health insurance policies, the contract is
always "off the rack." It is sold "as is" with no negotiation. In the
case of group-based health insurance policies, the kind of health
insurance an employee might obtain from her employer, for
example, the ability to meaningfully negotiate terms is negligible.
While there may appear to be some room for negotiation by the
employer (the entity actually purchasing the insurance) and some
variability as to terms (e.g., cost-sharing components, such as
copayments and deductibles, and network requirements), in
reality, there is no opportunity for significant bargaining as to
standard terms.28 Thus, regardless of the source of one's health
insurance, there is severely limited opportunity for negotiation as
to the standard terms of the health insurance contract.29
26. Pacheco v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 337 A.2d 240, 242 (R.I. 1975);
Pickering v. Am. Employers Ins. Co., 282 A.2d 584, 593 (R.I. 1971)
(recognizing that "[aln insurance contract is not the end result of the give-
and-take that goes on at a bargaining table" and "is not a true consensual
arrangement but one that is available to the premium-paying customer on a
take-it-or-leave-it-basis."). This lopsided arrangement has led one scholar to
remark, "[aidhesion contracts are a bullying device, and 'consent' to a bully is
no consent at all." Peter Linzer, "Implied," "Inferred," and "Imposed" Default
Rules and Adhesion Contracts - The Need for Radical Surgery, 28 PACE L.
REV. 195, 204 (2008).
27. See Peter D. Jacobson & Stefanie A. Doebler, "We Were All Sold a Bill
Of Goods:" Litigating the Science of Breast Cancer Treatment, 52 WAYNE L.
REV. 43, 100 (2006) ("State courts have traditionally viewed health insurance
policies as contracts of adhesion . . . .").
28. See Feinman, supra note 24 ("[T]he insured may be offered varying
policy limits, riders, and amendments, but those are also adhesion
alternatives that do not dramatically expand the range of choices available.").
29. In fact, those who receive their health insurance through an employer
have no opportunity to negotiate at all, since the employer is the actual
purchaser of the contract. Since most Americans receive their health
insurance through an employer, this means that most Americans have no say
as to the terms contained in their health insurance contract. For data on the
number of Americans who receive their health insurance through an
employer, see Health Insurance Coverage of Nonelderly - Kaiser State
Health Facts (2008),
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B. Unreadability
One of the defining characteristics of contracts of adhesion,
and insurance contracts in particular, is that they are unreadable.
There appears to be total consensus on this point. Law
professors, 30 treatises, 31 commentators 32 and the Restatement
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=126&cat=3 (concluding
that in 2008, approximately sixty percent of this country's nonelderly
population was covered by an employer-based health plan). The detachment
of the employee from the negotiation process also exists in the case of self-
funded employer health plans, since the plan documents, with their standard
terms, are typically generated by a third-party administrator, usually an
insurance company. A self-insured plan is not based on an insurance
contract with an insurer, but is instead funded by an employer (i.e., the
employer pays claims covered by the benefit plan from its own money).
Courtney Lyons Snyder, Cost Containment May Have A Price, But Is It A
Crime? Analyzing The Basis For Criminalizing Managed Care Conduct, 70 U.
PITT. L. REV. 301, 315 n.95 (2008).
30. See, e.g., Feinman, supra note 24 ("The document typically is not read
by the insured and, in significant part, is not likely to be understood if it is
read . . . ."); John Dwight Ingram, The Insured's Expectations Should Be
Honored Only If They Are Reasonable, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 813, 841
(1997) ("We probably must accept the fact that most insureds will not
voluntarily read their policies and, at most, merely will scan the first page.");
Robert H. Jerry II, Consent, Contract, and the Responsibilities of Insurance
Defense Counsel, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 153, 171 (1997) ("Insureds rarely read
their policies until they have a reason to do so, and even then they are
unlikely to understand much of what they read."); Michael B. Rappaport, The
Ambiguity Rule and Insurance Law: Why Insurance Contracts Should Not Be
Construed Against The Drafter, 30 GA. L. REV. 171, 174 (1995) ("Most
consumers do not read their policies and would not understand them if they
did.").
31. 16A JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw AND
PRACTICE § 8843, at 231 (West Publishing Co., rev. vol. 1981) ("[Tlhe great
majority of persons never read their [insurance] policies, and 90% of those
who do read them, including attorneys and jurists, would not understand
them.").
32. See Amy D. Cubbage, The Interaction of the Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations and Ambiguity in Drafting: The Development of the Kentucky
Formulation, 85 KY. L.J. 435, 436 (1997) ("Given the incomprehensibility of
the language in many insurance policies, it is not surprising that most people
do not even bother to read their policies."); James A. Collier, Readability in
Insurance: An Analysis of the Comprehension of New Policies, 8 J. INS. ISSUES
79, 79 (1985) ("Nobody really believes that insurance policyholders read their
policies when they are delivered . . . ."); Forrest E. Harding, The Standard
Automobile Insurance Policy: A Study of its Readability, J. RISK & INS. 39, 39
(1967) (finding that the reading level of the standard automobile insurance
policy "was well beyond the reading ability of a significant percentage of the
United States adult population.").
HEALTH INSURANCE POLICIES
(Second) of ContractS33 all concede that people do not read their
insurance contracts, due in large part to the complexity of the
contracts. Perhaps the most colorful explanation of why an
insured might not read her insurance contract was written over a
hundred years ago by Justice Doe of the New Hampshire Supreme
Court at a time when the U.S. insurance industry was still in its
adolescence:
Forms of applications and policies (like those used in this
case), of a most complicated and elaborate structure, were
prepared, and filled with covenants, exceptions,
stipulations, provisos, rules, regulations and conditions,
rendering the policy void in a great number of
contingencies. These provisions were of such bulk and
character that they would not be understood by men in
general, even if subjected to a careful and laborious
study; by men in general, they were sure not to be studied
at all. The study of them was rendered particularly
unattractive, by a profuse intermixture of discourses on
subjects in which a premium payer would have no
interest. The compound, if read by him, would, unless he
were an extraordinary man, be an inexplicable riddle, a
mere flood of darkness and confusion. Some of the most
material stipulations were concealed in a mass of
rubbish, on the back side of the policy and the following
page, where few would expect to find anything more than
a dull appendix, and where scarcely any one would think
of looking for information so important as that the
company claimed a special exemption from the operation
of the general law of the land relating to the only
business in which the company professed to be engaged.
As if it were feared that, notwithstanding these
discouraging circumstances, some extremely eccentric
person might attempt to examine and understand the
meaning of the involved and intricate net in which he was
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b (1981) ("A party
who makes regular use of a standardized form of agreement does not
ordinarily expect his customers to understand or even to read the standard
terms.. . . Customers do not in fact ordinarily understand or even read the
standard terms.").
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to be entangled, it was printed in such small type, and in
lines so long and so crowded, that the perusal of it was
made physically difficult, painful, and injurious. Seldom
has the art of typography been so successfully diverted
from the diffusion of knowledge to the suppression of it.34
Sadly, this sorry state of affairs has not changed much since
Justice Doe wrote his assessment of insurance policies in 1873.
Similar sentiments (though slightly less effusive) have been
echoed by many other judges, who have readily recognized that
insureds rarely, if ever, read their policies and would not
understand them if they did.35
Despite the universally held understanding that insurance
contracts are unreadable, there have only been limited efforts to
address the problem ex ante. 36 Quite to the contrary, unreadable
insurance contracts have been allowed to proliferate, subject only
to ex post judicial governance through two main cannons of
34. DeLancey v. Insurance Co., 52 N.H. 581, 587-88, 1873 WL 4180 at *7
(N.H. June, 1873).
35. See, e.g., State Security Life Ins. Co. v. Kintner, 185 N.E.2d 527, 532
(Ind. 1962) (Arterburn, C.J., concurring) ("even if the insured had the
inclination to attempt to read the policy, I doubt that he would gain much
more knowledge than he previously had because of the technical language he
would encounter. I doubt that most lawyers or even judges (who say one is
presumed to have read his insurance policy) ever read them."); C & J
Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Iowa 1975) ("It is
generally recognized the insured will not read the detailed, cross-referenced,
standardized, mass-produced insurance form, nor understand it if he does.");
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schwarzer, 237 N.E.2d 50, 53 n.3 (Mass.
1968) (recognizing that the "everyday" purchaser of insurance "seldom reads
the policy and application, either because he cannot understand its detailed
and technical terms, or because of a failure to realize its importance."); Rory
v. Continental Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 23, 56 (Mich. 2005) (Weaver, J.,
dissenting) ("Even if the insured were to read the policy, insurance policies
are not easy to understand and contain obscure provisions, the meaning of
which requires legal education to grasp."); Atwater Creamery Co. v. W. Nat'l
Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 277 (Minn. 1985) (recognizing that a
layperson may not be able to read and understand insurance policies); Kelly
v. Painter, 504 S.E.2d 171, 176 n.2 (W.Va. 1998) ("We do not seriously expect
that an insurance consumer will carefully read and understand an insurance
policy."); Dowhower ex rel. Rosenberg v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 613 N.W.2d
557, 567 (Wis. 2000) ("Even people who do read their insurance policies often
do not understand these contracts.").
36. See e.g., infra note 105 and accompanying text (although many states
have enacted readability standards, those standards are universally higher
than the reading level of the average adult).
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contract construction: contra proferentem and the doctrine of
reasonable expectations.
1. Contra Proferentem
Although the contra proferentem doctrine "has long existed in
most Romanistic, common law, and code-based regimes,"37 the
ascent of the U.S. insurance industry in the nineteenth century,
the proliferation of standard form agreements in the U.S. economy
in the early twentieth century, and an influential 1943 law review
article by Friedrich Kessler 38 propelled the doctrine to
prominence. 39 Kessler's article highlighted the economic disparity
between the drafters and recipients of contracts of adhesion,
which, in Kessler's view, gave rise to oppressive contract terms. 40
Kessler's view struck a chord with judges, "who began to regard
mass-produced form contracts with skepticism,"41 and began to
apply contra proferentem against the drafters of such contracts.
Contra proferentem remains a popular approach to the judicial
governance of adhesion contracts and is used by virtually all
courts,42 including Rhode Island.
Under the doctrine, once a court determines that a term in a
contract is ambiguous or susceptible of more than one meaning,
the term is construed against the drafter. 43 However, unless a
37. David Horton, Flipping the Script: Contra Proferentem and Standard
Form Contracts, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 431, 438 (2009).
38. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About
Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 629 (1943).
39. Horton, supra note 37, at 440-44.
40. Id. at 444.
41. Id. at 444-45.
42. Stephen J. Ware, A Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1461, 1464-65 (1989). See also Ingram, supra note 30, at
816 (explaining that "most, if not all, courts apply the rule of contra
proferentem"to adhesion contracts).
43. See R.I. Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. McKee Bros. Oil Corp., 649 A.2d
511, 511 (R.I. 1994); West v. Commercial Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J., 528 A.2d
339, 341 n.2 (R.I. 1987) (noting that insurance policy language that is
ambiguous or susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation will be
strictly construed against the insurer); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 206 (1981) ("In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a
promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred
which operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom a
writing otherwise proceeds."); Kelly E. Noble, National Refrigeration, Inc. et
al. v. The Travelers Indem. Co. of America et al., 14 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
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court finds that the term in question is ambiguous, normal
contract rules apply. 44 If the term is not ambiguous, the court will
apply the contract term as written, and the parties will be bound
by that term.45 Thus, the doctrine will not apply to a dispute
arising from an unambiguous term, even if the term is
unreadable, buried in the contract, or cannot be understood by an
insured.46 In other words, a term such as subrogation that is
unambiguous technically but not understandable by many
insureds may be the subject of a dispute, but contra proferentem
will not help the insured. This creates a paradox or perhaps a
convenient fiction.
Even judges agree that insurance contracts are contracts of
adhesion, that they are not the product of a "meeting of the
minds," that they are the product of uneven bargaining power,
that they are sold on a take-it-or-leave-it-basis, and that they are
unreadable. Nevertheless, unless the terms of a policy are
ambiguous, courts will enforce the terms of the policy as if it were
a contract that was the product of negotiation by parties on a level
playing field. To make matters worse, even if courts could
maintain the fiction that insurance policies are contracts for the
purposes of enforcement, there is the additional fact that anyone
who has ever purchased insurance can attest to: Insurance
contracts are not delivered to the insured until after the policy has
been purchased. 47 Thus an insured never has the opportunity to
read and agree to the terms of the contract before they bind her.
2. Reasonable Expectations
The reasonable expectations doctrine, first articulated by
REV. 417, 424 (2009) (noting that Rhode Island courts typically construe
contracts of adhesion against the drafter).
44. West, 528 A.2d at 341 n.2.
45. Malo v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 459 A.2d 954, 956 (R.I. 1983).
46. See Rivera v. Gagnon, 847 A.2d 280, 285 (R.I. 2004) ("[I]t is well
established that 'a party who signs an instrument manifests his assent to it
and cannot later complain that he did not read the instrument or that he did
not understand its contents."' (quoting Kottis v. Cerilli, 612 A.2d 661, 668
(R.I. 1992))).
47. See Feinman, supra note 24; Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights
at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 968 (1970);
Slawson, supra note 25, at 540.
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Robert Keeton 48 in his seminal 1970 Harvard Law Review
article, 49  attempts to honor the "objectively reasonable
expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding
the terms of insurance contracts . . . even though painstaking
study of the policy provisions would have negated those
expectations."50 Under the doctrine, courts can "ignore terms that
the insured had justly not thought to be part of the policy."51
Since a major justification of the doctrine of reasonable
expectations is the universally accepted idea that most
policyholders do not read their policies after they receive them, 52
the reasonable expectations doctrine appears to address the
gaping deficiency of the doctrine of contra proferentem. This,
however, is not the case in Rhode Island.
Although initially accepted 53 and recognized in the
Restatement (Second) of ContractS,54 courts "began to invoke the
reasonable expectations doctrine in wildly different ways."55
Some courts applied a hypothetical reasonable expectation, some
applied the insured's own subjective expectations, some used the
doctrine to exclude unambiguous but hidden provisions, and
others required an ambiguity before the doctrine could be
applied. 56  Rhode Island has embraced the last of these
approaches.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court first recognized the doctrine
in Elliott Leases Cars, Inc. v. Quigley.57 In Elliott, the Court
found that the contract of adhesion in question created "a
reasonable expectation of coverage," despite contradictory
language and held that the contract obligated the drafter to
provide insurance to the purchaser.58 As a result, Rhode Island
48. Horton, supra note 37, at 449.
49. Keeton, supra note 47.
50. Id. at 967.
51. Horton, supra note 37, at 446.
52. Eugene R. Anderson & James J. Fournier, Why Courts Enforce
Insurance Policyholders' Objectively Reasonable Expectations of Insurance
Coverage, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 335, 363 (1998).
53. Horton, supra note 37, at 450.
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981).
55. Horton, supra note 37, at 450.
56. Id. at 450 & nn.104-08 (collecting cases).
57. 373 A.2d 810, 814 (R.I. 1977).
58. Id. at 814 n.1 ("[Tlhe objectively reasonable expectations of one who
enters a contract of adhesion will be enforced, despite the existence of
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initially appeared to have adopted without limitation the doctrine
of reasonable expectations with respect to contracts of adhesion.59
This precedent would not last. The doctrine was subsequently
watered down and its application limited to insurance contracts
requiring the interpretation of ambiguous or conflicting
provisions, 60 thereby blending the doctrine of reasonable
expectations with the doctrine of contra proferentem.61 In the end,
Rhode Island's reasonable expectations doctrine suffers from the
same disability as its doctrine of contra proferentem; the
reasonable expectations doctrine does nothing to address problems
arising from an unreadable insurance policy.
3. The Limits of Ex Post Judicial Governance
The doctrine of reasonable expectations and the doctrine of
contra proferentem, ex post judicial interventions intended to
remedy the harm to consumers from contracts of adhesion, spring
from a vision of contract law that seeks to "identify conditions
under which opportunism is likely to flower and . . . emphasize[s]
the role of contract institutions and contract law as ex post
governance mechanisms for controlling opportunism." 62 While
commentators have argued that these doctrines encourage
contrary contract provisions.").
59. Id. (noting that the result "is consistent with the position adopted in
a growing number of jurisdictions that the objectively reasonable
expectations of one who enters a contract of adhesion will be enforced, despite
the existence of contrary contract provisions.") (citing Keeton, supra note 47,
at 967 and cases from other jurisdictions). Oddly, though, the Court seemed
to simultaneously embrace the doctrine and hold it at arm's length when it
stated at the bottom of the same footnote:
In the present case there is no need to pass on the general validity of
the above rule of law, and reference to the foregoing cases is not
intended as an unequivocal endorsement. We do feel, however, that
those cases reflect the importance which should be attached to the
objectively reasonable expectations of purchasers in situations such
as that presented in the case at bar. Id.
60. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Russo Bros., Inc., 641 A.2d 1297,
1300-01 (R.I. 1994).
61. Anderson & Fournier, supra note 52, at 353 & n.57 (noting that
Rhode Island and several other states combine the two doctrines and
providing a list of states that recognize some variation of the reasonable
expectations doctrine).
62. Bob Works, Excusing Nonoccurrence of Insurance Policy Conditions
in Order to Avoid Disproportionate Forfeiture: Claims-Made Formats as Test
Case, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 505, 553-55 (1998-99).
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insurers to draft better, less surprising or ambiguous contracts in
order to avoid liability, the limitations of both doctrines are
apparent. 63 Moreover, such arguments offer little consolation to
an insured since "she still has to go to court and litigate the issue
against the drafter, who is probably a repeat player and thus has
economies of scale and a much greater incentive to litigate the
specific issue."64
Yet, this burden on insureds does not seem to generate much
sympathy in the courts. After all, contracts of adhesion do provide
some benefits. Standardized terms reduce transaction costs,
stabilize business practices, ensure consistency, and promote
predictability for the drafter. In theory, this saves the drafter
time and money.65 Perhaps courts consider these efficiencies as a
counterbalance to the pitfalls and inequities of contracts of
adhesion. Indeed, one might ask, "Why then do we care if health
insurance contracts are readable or not?" After all, insurance
contracts are all equally unreadable and health insurance
contracts should be treated no differently by the courts than other
types of insurance contracts. However, as discussed in the next
section, health insurance contracts are fundamentally different
from all other insurance contracts in that they are contracts of
recurring use. Consequently, ex ante governance is needed-
health insurance contracts must be made readable in the first
instance.
II. HEATH INSURANCE AND CONTRACTS OF RECURRING USE
There are several commonly understood ways in which health
insurance differs from other kinds of insurance. For example,
health insurance provides the types of benefits we do not expect
from other types of insurance contracts. Health insurance also
typically requires that its benefits be obtained from a limited list
63. See, e.g., Keeton, supra note 47, at 968 (reasonable expectations);
Noble, supra note 43, at 424-25 ("Construing contracts against the insurance
company forces the insurance company to swallow any ambiguities, driving
them to be the more responsible and careful party in the transaction.")
(contra proferentem).
64. Linzer, supra note 26, at 207-08.
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a (1981); Todd
D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1174, 1221-22 (1983).
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of health care providers because insurers and health care
providers enter into relationships that are not present between
insurers and third parties for other types of insurance. Finally,
health insurance provides insureds continuous coverage.
Health insurance is also different from other types of
insurance in less commonly understood ways. For example,
health insurance contracts are repeatedly referenced. In other
words, health insurance contracts (and their supporting materials,
such as "quick references" or "benefit summaries") are used
repeatedly as reference guides. Consumers, especially when they
are sick, reference their health insurance policies repeatedly to
determine what is and what is not covered. Health insurance
policies also operate as financing mechanisms for health care-
i.e., they dictate the terms under which medical diagnoses, tests,
and procedures are covered and then finance those covered
procedures.
A. Commonly Understood Reasons Why Health Insurance is
Different
Health insurance,66 unlike automobile insurance, typically
covers the cost of predictable expenses and maintenance care. If
this were also the standard for automobile insurance, we would
expect an automobile insurer to cover the cost of a tune-up,
installation of an alternator belt, the purchase of new tires, or the
replacement of a burned out headlight. In the health insurance
context, routine health care, such as checkups, child "well visits,"
mammograms, maternity-related care, and cholesterol screenings
are commonplace. 67  Indeed, potential purchasers of health
66. The term health insurance generally refers to insurance providing so-
called "comprehensive coverage." Laura D. Hermer, Private Health
Insurance in the United States: A Proposal for a More Functional System, 6
Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POLY 1, 27 (2005). Of course, the term
"comprehensive" has different meanings under different policies. There is
still, however, a viable market for limited benefit health insurance products.
These products include so-called "dread disease" policies, which are similar to
life insurance and provide a stipulated benefit upon the diagnosis of certain
"dread" diseases, and specified disease policies, which provide coverage for
the treatment of a specific disease. These limited benefit plans are intended
to supplement comprehensive coverage. Tara Arschin, Battling Breast
Cancer: New York's Laws Are Not Enough, 13 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 579,
588 (2007).
67. See, e.g., Health Insurance Not Like Other Insurance, UPI, Sept. 14,
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insurance often look for and expect such predictable and recurring
coverage.68
Another commonly understood difference between health
insurance and other types of insurance centers on the relationship
between the insurers and the providers of services. Unlike
automobile insurance where you may take your.car to any number
of collision repair centers, health insurance often limits whom we
may use as providers. In automobile insurance, there are no
networks or other limiting relationships that exist between
insurer and a repair shop that affect the amount paid by the
insured under the policy. Such policies only create a relationship
and a set of obligations between the insured and the insurer.
Thus, if an automobile is involved in an accident, the insured and
an adjuster determine the cost of the repair. The insured (or the
repair shop) is then either paid the negotiated amount (less any
deductibles, which are the responsibility of the insured), or if the
accident is major, the automobile is declared a total loss, the
owner is reimbursed the book value of the automobile, and the
automobile is sold by the insurer for salvage. 69 On the other
hand, today most health insurance involves at least some aspect of
managed care-the integration of health insurers and providers
through networks of preferred providers 7o-the purpose of which
2009, available at http://www.upi.com/HealthNews/2009/09/14/Health-
insurance-not-like-other-insurance/UPI-77921252954497; Larry Van Horn,
What If Health Coverage Was Like Other Insurance?, MODERN HEALTHCARE,
Oct. 6, 2009, available at
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20091006/REG/910069997; Zach
Krajacic, Why Can't Health Insurance Be More Like Auto Insurance?,
CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, Aug. 5, 2009, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2009/0805/p09s02-
coop.html.
68. See Jennifer Arlen & W. Bentley MacLeod, Malpractice Liability for
Physicians and Managed Care Organizations, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1929, 1969
n.142 (2003) (noting that healthy patients tend to investigate managed
health care quality in terms of low cost, standard offerings like vaccinations,
well-visits, and maternity-related care (citing Russell Korobkin, The
Efficiency of Managed Care "Patient Protection" Laws: Incomplete Contracts,
Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 40-44, 60-62
(1999))).
69. David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Anatomy of Health
Insurance 34 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7176,
1999), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7176.
70. Jacob S. Hacker & Theodore R. Marmor, How Not to Think About
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is "to allow the insurer to cover its beneficiaries' expenses on a
negotiated schedule below the prevailing market rate."71 This
integration "is virtually unheard of in insurance of other typeS"72
and places an increased burden on those with health insurance to
use their health coverage in a way that will maximize their
benefits. In other words, insureds must understand their network
and its limitations or they risk reduced or denied benefits. 73
This scenario raises yet a third commonly understood
difference between health insurance and automobile insurance-
continuing coverage. A crashed automobile can be "totaled."
When this happens, an insured does not collect more than the
actual cash value of the automobile but is instead restored to
approximately the same financial position she had before the
accident-i.e., she is paid the book value. This is not the case with
health insurance. While an automobile insurer can avoid cost-
ineffective repairs to a severely damaged automobile by declaring
it a total loss and making a fixed payment, this type of claims
system cannot work with health care. "Totaling" a human body is
not an option for the very sick.74 Even in the case of high-cost
chronically ill, severely injured, or dying patients, covered claims
are required to be paid up to any annual or lifetime caps.
In addition to the three properties described above (coverage
for predictable and recurring claims, network limitations that
constrain coverage, and continuing coverage for high-cost
patients), there is another reason why health insurance is
different-we use it constantly. Unlike an automobile policy that
"Managed Care", 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 661, 669-70 (1999) (noting an
industry estimate that only two percent of private health plans are
traditional fee-for-service indemnity insurance, another sixteen percent are
fee-for-service but employ some form of utilization review and concluding that
"between eighty and ninety-eight percent of today's private health insurers
appear to fall into the broad category of managed care.").
71. Geddes v. United Staffing Alliance Employee Med. Plan, 469 F.3d
919, 930 (10th Cir. 2006). See also Cutler & Zeckhauser, supra note 69, at 35
("Managed care partly represents a price club. In exchange for an up-front
fee, the patient gets to purchase goods at a significant discount. The
discounts are secured through bulk purchase bargaining, or by directly hiring
the sellers. In exchange for lower prices, patients precommit to receive care
from a limited set of providers, or to pay harshly for the privilege of going
elsewhere.").
72. Cutler & Zeckhauser, supra note 69.
73. See id. at 35.
74. See id. at 34.
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may be used only a few times over the life of an automobile, if at
all, a health insurance policy is a contract of recurring use. Claims
are made more frequently under health insurance policies than
under any other types of insurance policies because our use of
health care services is routine. Some basic statistics bear this fact
out. Eighty-three percent of Americans had contact with a health
professional in 2006.75 In that same year, the average American
saw a doctor three times, 76 119.2 million people went to the
emergency room,77 and 34.9 million people were admitted to (and
were discharged from) a hospital. Their average length of stay
was nearly five days.78 In most of these instances, consumers
relied on their health insurance to cover the cost of medical
procedures. Given that consumers repeatedly draw on their
health insurance in such instances, the ability to understand and
use a health insurance contract-with all of its terms of coverage,
network constraints, cost sharing requirements (e.g., deductibles
and coinsurance), exclusions, riders, endorsements and coverage
limits-is critical for insureds. Health insurance requires
continued and repeated efforts to understand the terms and limits
of the policy in order to ensure that services will be covered.
B. Less Commonly Understood Reasons Why Health Insurance is
Different
Yet, there is an even more fundamental set of reasons why
health insurance is different from other types of insurance-
reasons that focus on the economics behind health insurance
coverage. Health insurance contracts not only provide a hedge
against risk but they also finance health care. Standard economic
theory suggests that, subject to budget constraints, risk-averse
individuals will purchase insurance to maximize their utility in
the face of uncertainty. In other words, in the face of an unknown
future, individuals would rather purchase insurance and take a
75. NAT'L CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUmAN SERVICES, HEALTH: UNITED STATES 340 (2009), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/docvisit.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2010).
76. See id.
77. Id. at 341.
78. Hospital Utilization (in Non-Federal Short-Stay Hospitals), Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention,
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/hospital.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2010).
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certain, moderate monetary loss in exchange for a hedge against a
large financial loss resulting from an unexpected accident, illness,
or injury.79 The risk that any one individual will need expensive
health care in any given year may be fairly small, yet the potential
financial consequences associated with that risk could be great.
An otherwise healthy individual can have an accident, break a few
bones, and spend few weeks in the hospital and, without health
insurance, might have to use up her life savings to pay for her
health care.s0
In this respect, health care stands in stark contrast to many
of life's necessities, such as food, clothing and shelter. An
individual's need for these necessities is quite foreseeable and,
therefore, her expenditures on these things can be predicted.81 On
the other hand, except for those with chronic conditions, an
individual's expected health care expenditures are largely
unknown beyond routine care, such as yearly check-ups. 82 Thus,
in one respect, an individual buys health insurance for the same
reason she buys comprehensive automobile insurance: to protect
against risk.83 In the case of automobile insurance, a purchaser is
insuring against the risk of financial consequences that could
result from future damage to her automobile. In the case of
health insurance, she is insuring against the risk of financial
consequences that might result from future illness or injury.84
This is the so-called risk-avoidance value of purchasing
insurance8 5 and is a common basis for the purchase of insurance.
The decision to purchase health insurance, however, involves
much more than fear of large financial loss. One feature that
distinguishes health insurance from other types of insurance-and
makes it attractive to a potential purchaser-is its capability to
79. See Todd Gilmer & Richard Kronick, It's the Premiums, Stupid:
Projections of the Uninsured Through 2013, HEALTH AFF., Apr. 5, 2005, at
W5-143, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgilreprint/hlthaff.w5.143vl.pdf.
80. Cutler & Zeckhauser, supra note 69, at 9.
81. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical
Care, 53 AM. EcON. REV. 941, 943 (1963).
82. See id. at 941.
83. Willard G. Manning & M. Susan Marquis, Health Insurance: The
Tradeoff Between Risk Pooling and Moral Hazard, 15 J. HEALTH EcON. 609,
609-10 (1996).
84. John A. Nyman, The Value of Health Insurance: The Access Motive,
18 J. HEALTH EcoN. 141, 141-42 (1999). See Arrow, supra note 81.
85. Nyman, supra note 84, at 142.
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finance health care through transfers of income within a given
risk pool. This capability offers putative health insurance
consumers two additional values beyond risk avoidance: access
value and a security value.
1. The Access Value of Health Insurance
Health insurance offers access to expensive health care that
would not otherwise be affordable to an individual. 86 This access
value of health insurance is different from the risk-avoidance
value of health insurance because, for all but the very wealthy,
there is no financial risk for extremely high-cost health care
purchases. Most people simply cannot afford to purchase such
care and the typical means of accumulating money to purchase an
expensive medical procedure are not typically available when
health care is needed. In other words, there may not be sufficient
income or time to save for a high-cost health care purchase. A
bank is likely to be reluctant to lend money for a high-cost health
care purchase, particularly when the borrower's ability to secure
the loan or repay is limited. Thus, health insurance is, in most
cases, the only mechanism available for accessing such health
care. 87 This situation creates a value to and a demand for health
insurance that is non-existent in other types of insurance.88
Recall that most other types of insurance act to indemnify against
a loss; they are designed to restore the insured to the financial
position she enjoyed just prior to the loss. This is not the case
with health insurance, which is typically designed to cover the
cost of health care that is "medically necessary" to the diagnosis or
treatment of an injury or illness covered by the insured's policy. 89
86. Id. at 142-43.
87. Id.
88. See Jerry L. Mashaw & Theodore R. Marmor, Conceptualizing,
Estimating, and Reforming Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Health Care
Spending, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 455, 460 (1994) ("[Tlhe uncertainty of the need
for medical care, coupled with the devastatingly high cost of treatment,
creates a vigorous demand for health insurance.").
89. CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS
INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH REFORM 125-32, 140-43 (Am. Enter. Inst. Press
1995) (most health insurance contracts cover medically necessary services
subject to specific coverage exclusions); Gary T. Schwartz, A National Health
Care Program: What Its Effect Would Be on American Tort Law and
Malpractice Law, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1339, 1376 (1994) ("The language of
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Absent the financial limitations typically present in other types of
insurance, health insurance becomes a means of access to high-
cost, otherwise unaffordable health care. Consequently, people
finance their health care purchases through additional health
insurance-generated income obtained from the risk pool (i.e., the
other insureds they are grouped with by the insurance
company).90 An extreme example would be someone who requires
multiple organ transplants (e.g., a heart-lung transplant) and
years of follow-up care. Very few can afford such treatment
absent health insurance, yet we would expect our health
insurance to cover precisely that type of health care if we need it.
Thus, the benefits of health insurance exceed mere avoidance
of financial risk by a risk-averse purchaser; the benefits of health
insurance include access to health care that would not otherwise
be accessible, hence the access value of health insurance.91
2. The Security Value of Health Insurance
Health insurance is also purchased to protect against the risk
of persistently higher future expenses in the case of chronic
illness.92 This security value of health insurance is somewhat
similar to the access value of health insurance in that it ensures
future access to high-cost health care, but the type of care that is
made available through the security value of health insurance is
not necessarily the completely unaffordable health care the access
value targets. Instead, the security value provides access for
expected high (but not necessarily astronomical) costs, like those
associated with a chronic condition. Indeed, obtaining insurance
as a hedge against the expected costs of a chronic condition is a
central reason why Americans purchase health insurance.
According to the federal Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, the risks posed by chronic conditions are staggering:
Almost half of all Americans live with at least one chronic
'medically necessary' is currently common in health insurance contracts, and
'medically necessary' is often interpreted broadly as meaning 'medically
appropriate' rather than 'medically imperative."').
90. John A. Nyman, Is 'Moral Hazard' Inefficient? The Policy
Implications of a New Theory, 23 HEALTH AFF. 194, 196 (2004).
91. See Nyman, supra note 84, at 142-45.
92. Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, Myths and Misconceptions
About U.S. Health Insurance, HEALTH AFF., Oct. 21, 2008, at W534,
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/abstract/27/6/w533.
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condition, chronic diseases account for seventy percent of all
deaths in the United States, and health care costs associated with
chronic diseases account for more than seventy-five percent of the
nation's health care costs. 93 For those with chronic conditions
who are able to obtain health insurance, coverage can provide
significant financial security in the face of predictable, expensive
health care costs. For insureds who suffer chronic conditions, the
value of health insurance is not only measured in terms of its risk
and access values, it is also measured in terms of the expected
security value against predictable, long-term, and expensive
health care costs.
3. Health Insurance as a Financing Mechanism
Recognition of the access value and security value of health
insurance leads to the inescapable conclusion that health
insurance does much more than provide a hedge against risk: It
operates as a financing mechanism. National data on health care
spending confirms this conclusion. The data demonstrate that
health insurance has displaced out-of-pocket expenses as the
dominant source of private payments for health care. In 1960,
out-of-pocket payments accounted for over two-thirds of the
private payments spent to provide all health care to individuals,
while health insurance accounted for a little over one-quarter of
such payments. Less than fifty years later, these proportions are
completely reversed. In 2007, out-of-pocket payments only
accounted for about a quarter of the private payments spent to
provide all health care to individuals, while health insurance
payments had grown to about two-thirds of all private health
expenditures to provide health care to individuals. 94
93. Chronic Diseases and Health Promotion, Chronic Disease Overview,
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
http://www.cdc.gov/NCCdphp/overview.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2010).
94. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES, available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/02_NationalHealthAcco
untsHistorical.asp#TopOfPage (follow "National Health Expenditures by type
of service and source of funds, CY 1960-2008 (ZIP, 41KB)" hyperlink). The
figures reflect "Personal Health Care Expenditures." See also CENTERS FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES ACCOUNTS: DEFINITIONS, SOURCES, AND
METHODS 3 (2007), available at
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The problems associated with contracts of adhesion (uneven
bargaining power, oppressive terms, and widely recognized lack of
readability), the lack of effective ex post judicial governance of
such contracts, and the constellation of factors that set health
insurance apart from other types of insurance (coverage for
predictable claims, network limitations, the access and security
values, the financing function, and the recurring use of health
insurance contracts) make imperative a "front-end" effort to
provide more robust protections for consumers of health
insurance. This need for an ex ante solution was the impetus for
the development of Rhode Island's requirement that insurers
improve the readability of health insurance contracts.
III. RHODE ISLAND'S READABILITY REQUIREMENT FOR HEALTH
INSURANCE POLICIES
Under the Standards for Readability of Health Insurance
Forms, beginning in August 30, 2010, all health insurance policies
issued or renewed in Rhode Island will have to be written at the
eighth grade level.9 5 At that time all health insurance companies
will be required to certify that the text of any policy 96 "does not
exceed the eighth-grade reading level as measured by the Flesch-
Kincaid formula."9 7 All policies will also have to meet other
requirements, such as a minimum font size, designed to improve
readability.98
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/02_NationalHealthAcco
untsHistorical.asp#TopOfPage (follow "Definitions, Sources, Methods (PDF,
35KB)" hyperlink) (defining "Personal Health Care Expenditures").
95. Standards for Readability of Health Insurance Forms, 2-31-5 R.I.
CODE R. (Weil 2010), available at
http://www2.sec.state.ri.us/dar/regdocs/released/pdf/HICO/5768.pdf.
96. The term "policy" means "all health insurance forms" required to be
submitted to OHIC for approval, including, but not limited to "certificates of
coverage, subscriber agreements, endorsements and modifications to
contracts, policies, benefits booklets, and summary plan descriptions." Id. §
3(a).
97. Id. § 5(a)(1). An insurer may use an alternate method or formula for
assessing readability as long as the insurer can demonstrate that the
alternate method or formula can be used to determine a reading level at or
below the eighth grade reading level. Id. § 5(b).
98. The policy may not contain text of less than twelve-point type (with
some exceptions), may not give undue prominence to any portion of the text,
and must include a table of contents or an index if the policy has more than
3,000 word or is longer than three pages. Id. § 5(b)-(d).
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Although Rhode Island is not the first state to impose a
readability requirement on insurance contracts, it is the first state
to impose a readability requirement for all health insurance
policies that approaches the actual reading ability of its citizens.
While readability formulas have been a mainstay of insurance
regulation since the 1970s, most states have established a
readability requirement well above the reading level of the
average American adult.
A. Readability and Insurance Regulation
States began to first employ readability requirements for
insurance contracts in the mid to late 1970s as a reaction to state
and federal initiatives to promote subjective "plain language"
standards for consumer contracts. 99  Insurance companies,
however, were concerned about the possible imposition of
subjective readability standards and were fearful that differing
subjective standards in each state could lead to different
readability determinations of the same policy language by
different states. In 1977, the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) created a task force to study and develop
uniform standards for language simplification in life insurance
policies.oo At the time, three states had already begun to use an
objective standard, the Flesch Reading Ease (FRE) formula,101
and the task force determined that the FRE should be part of the
99. Michael S. Friman, Plain English Statutes, 7 Loy. CONSUMER L. REP.
103, 105-106 (1995); Calvin J. Karlin, Readability Statutes-A Survey and a
Proposed Model, 28 U. KAN. L. REV. 531, 532-535 (1980). For a brief history of
the federal government's use of plain language see Joanne Locke, A History
of Plain Language in the United States Government
(2004),http://www.plainlanguage.gov/whatisPL/historyllocke.cfm.
100. Karlin, supra note 99, at 537 n.40.
101. Id. at 535. The FRE formula calculates readability using two
variables: the average number of syllables per word in texts and average
sentence length measured in terms of the number of words per sentence.
WILLIAM H. DUBAY, THE PRINCIPLES OF READABILITY 21-22 (2004), available at
http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDoes/datalericdoes2sql/content-storage-01/00000
19b/80/1b/bfl46.pdf. The FRE formula yields a numeric index of reading
difficulty ranging from 0 (unreadable) to 100 (very readable). The formula for
the FRE is 206.835 - (84.6 * ASW) - (1.015 * ASL), where ASW is the average
number of syllables per word and ASL is the average sentence length,
determined by the number of words per sentence. Id.
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NAIC's model act.102 However, the new model act required only a
score of 40 on the FRE103-i.e., a thirteenth grade reading
level. 104 While this score resulted in somewhat improved
readability of policies, policies remained written at a college
reading level, far above the reading level of most average
policyholders. Since then, thirty-three states (not including Rhode
Island) have adopted objective readability standards based on the
FRE, with scores generally ranging from fifty to forty.105 These
102. Karlin, supra note 99, at 534-36.
103. Id. at 536.
104. DUBAY, supra note 101, at 22. A forty on the FRE is equivalent to a
thirteenth grade level, that of a college freshman. See Id. Apparently, the
task force was concerned that requiring a higher score, which would indicate
a lower reading level, "might cause contrived sentence structure and word
selection, thereby reducing clarity." Karlin, supra note 99, at 536. There is
no indication how or why the committee came to this conclusion.
105. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1110.01 (2009) (Flesch score of 40
established by ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE §§ R20-6-201(C)(2), R20-6-213(C)(1)(a)
(2008)); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-80-206(a)(1) (2009) (Flesch score of 40); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 38a-297(a)(1) (2008) (Flesch score of 45); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18,
§ 2741(a) (2009) (Flesch score of 40 or more, however 40 or less may be
approved provided the length of sentences and words comply with other
standards); D.C. CODE § 31-4725(a)(1) (2009) (Flesch score of 40); FLA. STAT. §
627.4145(1)(a) (2009) (Flesch score of 45); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-3-25(b) (Flesch
score of 40); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10-104(1) (2009) (Flesch score of 40); IND.
CODE § 27-1-26-3(1) (2009) (Flesch score of 40); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.14-
440(1) (LexisNexis 2009) (Flesch score of 40 established by 806 Ky. ADMIN.
REGS. 14:121 § 5(1)(2010)); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2441.1.A (2009)
(Flesch score of 50); MASs. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 2B(1)(a) (2009) (Flesch score
of 50); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.2236(3)(a)-(c) (2009) (Flesch score of not less
than 45); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-15-325(1)(a) (2009) (Flesch score of 40); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 44-3405(1)(a) (2009) (Flesch score of 40); NEV. REV. STAT. §
687B.124(1)(a) (2009) (Flesch score of 40); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-
H:5(I)(a) (2009) (Flesch score of 40); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:17-21(a)(1) (West
2009) (Flesch score of 40); N.M. STAT. § 59A-19-4(A)(1) (2009) (Flesch score of
40); N.Y. INS. LAw § 3102(c)(1)(D) (Consol. 2009) (Flesch score of 45); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 58-38-30(b)(1) (2009) (Flesch score of 50 or more); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 26.1-36-14(1)(a) (2009) (Flesch score of 40); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3902.04(A)(1) (LexisNexis 2010) (Flesch score of 40); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, §
3645(A)(1) (2009) (Flesch score of 40); OR. REV. STAT. § 743.106(1)(a) (2007)
(Flesch score of 40 or more); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-61-30 (2009) (Flesch score of
40 established by S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 69-5.1(D)(1)(a) (2008); but see S.C.
CODE ANN. 37-4-105(B) (2009) (seventh grade on the Flesch-Kincaid
readability formula for credit life insurance and credit accident and sickness
insurance)); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-11A-3(1) (Flesch score of 40); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 56-7-1605(a)(1) (2009) (Flesch score of 40); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §
1201.101 (2009) (Flesch score of 40 established for health benefit plans by 28
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.602(b)(1) (2010); ninth grade readability standards
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scores equate to tenth to thirteenth grade reading levels,
respectively.106 Again, even though these are improvements over
policies written at a college or graduate reading level, they remain
two to five reading grade levels above that of the average
American adult.
B. Rhode Island's Standard
Committed to making health insurance policies that were
truly readable, Rhode Island chose to chart a new path when
establishing its Standards for Readability of Health Insurance
Forms. One of the key decisions in developing the new regulation
was in selecting the Flesch-Kincaid grade level formula rather
than the FRE formula. The Flesch-Kincaid formula was chosen
over the FRE because it is a more user-friendly measurement and
a more accurate readability measurement for assessing complex
technical writing, like that found in health insurance policies.
Like the FRE formula, the Flesch-Kinkaid formula is
calculated using two variables: the average number of syllables
per word in texts and average sentence length measured in terms
of the number of words per sentence. 107 The Flesch-Kinkaid
formula, a reformulation of the FRE formula originally developed
to assess the readability of Navy technical manuals, converts the
FRE's 0 to 100 score into an American grade level.108 As such, the
results of a calculation of the Flesch-Kincaid formula do not have
to be correlated to a table to be understood. Thus, for example, a
document that scores 8.2 using the Flesch-Kincaid formula is
readable at the eighth grade level. Moreover, although the FRE is
using various formulae for individual accident and health policies established
by 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3092(c)(1)- (2) (2009)); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-
3735(F) (2009) (Flesch score of 40 or more); W. VA. CODE § 33-29-5(a)(1)
(2009) (Flesch score of 40); Wis. STAT. § 631.22(2) (2009) (Flesch score of 50
for Medicare supplement policies and Flesch score of 40 for all other policies
established by WIs. ADMIN. CODE INS. § 6.07(4)(a)(1) (2009).
106. DUBAY, supra note 101, at 27, 35-36, 38-44.
107. DUBAY, supra note 101, at 50. The formula for the Flesch-Kincaid
score is (0.39 * ASL) + (11.8 * ASW) - 15.59, where ASL is the average
sentence length, determined by the number of words per sentence, and ASW
is the average number of syllables per word.
108. DUBAY, supra note 101, at 2; Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Readability Studies:
How Technocentrism Can Compromise Research and Legal Determinations,
26 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 147, 159 (2007).
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widely used, it does not correlate perfectly with grade levels
beyond the seventh grade. Beyond the seventh grade level, the
FRE formula "increasingly underestimates the grade level" of the
document tested, meaning that it could inaccurately score complex
health insurance documents.109 Finally, unlike the FRE formula,
the Flesch-Kincaid formula was tested on technical materials 110
and is therefore better suited for use with complex health
insurance policies.
The second key decision in developing the new regulation was
in mandating that all Rhode Island health insurance policies be
written at or below an eighth grade reading level. As mentioned
previously, most Rhode Island adults read at or below the eighth
grade level. This requirement is also within the generally
recommended readability standard for health-related legal
documents, which generally range from fourth to eighth grade
levels. 1 1 1 The readability results achievable under this standard
109. Sirico, supra note 108, at 159.
110. DUBAY, supra note 101, at 2, 51.
111. See, e.g., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., REP. No. OEI-06-01-00370, STATE CHILDREN'S HEALTH INSURANCE
PROGRAM (SCHIP) RENEWAL PROCESS 3 (2002), available at
http://www.oig.hhs.gov/oeilreports/oei-06-01-00370.pdf (noting that
"[miaterials written at the [seven]th to [eigh]th grade reading level are the
standard for what is readable by and suitable for the general public."); T. M.
Grundner, On the Readability of Surgical Consent Forms, 302 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 900, 901 (1980) (suggesting that adult consent forms should be at a
maximum of a seventh or eighth grade level); Sharona Hoffman, Regulating
Clinical Research: Informed Consent, Privacy, and IRBs, 31 CAP. U. L. REV.
71, 89 (2003) (recommending that informed consent documents be written at
an eighth grade reading level); Michael K. Paasche-Orlow et al., Readability
Standards for Informed-Consent Forms as Compared with Actual
Readability, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 721, 725 (2003) (suggesting that a fourth
to sixth grade reading level is a suitable target for consent forms for
institutional review boards); Martha Williams-Deane & Linda S. Potter,
Current Analysis of Oral Contraceptive Use Instructions: An Analysis of
Patient Package Inserts, 24 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 111, 114 (1992) (concluding
that patient labeling should be drafted at the fifth or sixth grade level). A
readability standard of the seventh to eighth grade level applicable to certain
health coverage-related documents has already been required in some
jurisdictions. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.056 (West 2010) ("To the
extent reasonable and consistent with the goals of providing easily
understandable and readable materials and complying with federal and state
laws governing the program, all written materials relating to determinations
of eligibility for or amounts of benefits that will be given to applicants for or
recipients of assistance under a program administered or supervised by the
commissioner of health must be understandable to a person who reads at the
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can readily be seen by revisiting the examples set out at the
beginning of this Article. Recall the "coordination of benefits"
clause:
The plan covering the patient as a dependent child of a
person whose date of birth occurs earlier in the calendar
year shall be primary over the plan covering the patient
as a dependent of a person whose date of birth occurs
later in the calendar year provided. However, in the case
of a dependent child of legally separated or divorced
parents, the plan covering the patient as a dependent of
the parent with legal custody, or as a dependent of the
custodial parent's spouse (i.e., stepparent), shall be
primary over the plan covering the patient as a
dependent of the parent without legal custody.
While a grade-level requirement can not fix everything that is
wrong with this passage, the new requirement will force insurers
to write shorter sentences and use smaller words, perhaps leading
to a passage that reads more like this:
What happens if my spouse and I both have health
coverage for our child?
If your child is covered under more than one insurance
policy, the policy of the adult whose birthday is earlier in
the year pays the claim first. For example: Your birthday
is in March; your spouse's birthday is in May. March
seventh-grade level . .. ."); Medicare Program; Criteria and Standards for
Evaluating Intermediary, Carrier, and Durable Medical Equipment,
Prosthetics, Orthotics, and Supplies (DMEPOS) Regional Carrier
Performance During Fiscal Year 2004, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,613, 74,615 (Dec. 24,
2003) (noting that letters, decisions, or correspondence that go to Medicare
beneficiaries from a Medicare contractor should be written below the eighth
grade reading level "unless it is obvious that an incoming request from the
beneficiary contains language written at a higher level"); Other Managed
Care Health Plan Obligations, MINN. R. 9506.0400 (2009) ("A health plan
shall provide each enrollee a certificate of coverage approved by the
commissioner, a health plan identification card, a list of participating
providers, and a description of the health plan complaint and appeal
procedure. All written information provided enrollees must be
understandable to a person reading at the seventh grade level . . . ."); Criteria
for Medicaid Reimbursement of Care in Nursing Facilities, TENN. COMP. R. &
REGS. 1200-13-1.10 (2010) (requiring sixth grade reading level notifications to
Medicaid nursing facility residents).
2010] 123
124 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 15:93
comes earlier in the year than May, so your policy will
pay for your child's claim first.
What happens if I am legally separated or divorced?
If your child is covered by your policy and also by the
policy of your separated or divorced spouse, the policy of
the parent with legal custody pays first. In other words,
if you have legal custody, your plan pays first. The same
rule applies even if your child is covered by a health
insurance policy of a stepparent. For example: Your
former spouse has legal custody, and his/her new spouse's
policy covers your child. The new spouse's policy will pay
your child's claim first.112
Recall the "subrogation" example:
In the event a third party, including your employer/agent,
is or may be responsible for causing an illness or injury
for which we provided any benefit or made any payment
to you, we shall succeed to your right of recovery against
such responsible party. This is our right of subrogation.
If you do not seek damages for your illness or injury, you
must permit us to initiate recovery on your behalf
(including the right to bring suit in your name).
Under the new requirement, the passage might read like this:
Your injury or illness may have been caused by someone
else. If so, we can collect from that person any claims we
pay on your behalf. For example, if we pay for your
hospital stay, we can collect the amount we paid for your
hospital stay from the person who hurt you. We can also
collect payment from that person even if he or she agreed
to pay you directly or has been ordered by a court to pay
you. If the person who caused your injury has already
paid you, we can collect from you the amount he or she
has already paid to you. This is called subrogation. In
addition, if you do not try to collect money from the
person who caused your injury, you agree to let us do so
112. Cogan, supra note 8.
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in your name.113
Both revised passages are written at the seventh grade level.
C. Criticism of Readability Formulas
While developing this new policy, we were sensitive to the fact
that readability formulas have been widely criticized.114 For
example, critics of the formulas have argued that the readability
formulas were developed for children,115 have never been
adequately tested on adults,116 have not been formulated for or
tested extensively on technical documents,11 7 ignore important
features like content and organization, 118 and have not been
adequately validated.119 Many such criticisms are overstated and
have been readily dismissed.120 In fact, formulas such as the FRE
and Flesch-Kinkaid formula were developed mainly for and have
been extensively tested on adults.121 The Flesch-Kinkaid formula
developed and tested using technical materials.122 Despite their
limitations, the readability variables tested in the formulas
remain the best predictors of text difficulty.123 This does not
mean that readability formulas are not without their flaws, but
until a viable, objective alternate tool is developed to predict text
difficulty, readability formulas like the Flesch-Kinkaid formula
and FRE remain the best tools used to objectively assess the
reading level of documents.124
113. Id.
114. For a summary of criticisms, see DUBAY, supra note 101, at 27.
115. Jack Selzer, Readability is a Four-Letter Word, J. Bus. COMM., Oct.
1981, at 25-26.
116. Id. at 26
117. Janice C. Redish & Jack Selzer, The Place of Readability Formulas in
Technical Communication, TECHNICAL COMM., Fourth Quarter 1985, at 47.
118. BERTRAM BRUCE ET AL., WHY READABILITY FORMULAS FAIL: READING
EDUCATION REPORT No. 28 4-5 (1981), available at
http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/dataleriedoes2sql/content-storage_01/00000
19b/80/2e/30/47.pdf.
119. Id. at 5-6.
120. See DUBAY, supra note 101, at 27, 35-36, 38-44.
121. Id. at 27.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 36.
124. There is little doubt that the clarity of a document depends on factors
that cannot be readily tested, such as "the intellectual complexity of the
contents and the syntactical complexity of the writing style." Sirico, supra
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CONCLUSION
Given the current complex health care environment, the
widespread use of complicated cost-sharing mechanisms by health
insurers, and the growing demand for consumers to take
responsibility for their own health care, it is more important than
ever for consumers to be able to read, understand, and effectively
use their health insurance policies. Since health insurance
contracts are quite different from other insurance contracts,
traditional ex post judicial governance mechanisms associated
with adhesion contracts, such as contra proferentem and the
doctrine of reasonable expectations, provide inadequate protection
for health insurance consumers. Thus, an ex ante solution is
needed. Rhode Island's ex ante solution is a requirement that all
health insurance policies be written at the eighth grade reading
level, as measured by the Flesch-Kinkaid formula. Commercially
available readability software not only makes this approach
efficient for insurers and OHIC, it eliminates subjective
judgments as to whether a policy is readable in the first instance.
While an eighth grade readability requirement alone cannot fix all
the problems associated with health insurance contracts,
readability is a prerequisite to understandability and an
appropriate starting point for determining whether a health
insurance policy should be marketed in Rhode Island. 125
note 108, at 149. Furthermore, no one disputes that clarity can be achieved
by using simple and familiar words, avoiding jargon, using culturally neutral
language, using correct grammar and punctuation, using an active voice and
present tense, and using simple graphic elements such as bulleted lists.
DUBAY, supra note 101, at 2. In the case of state regulators, who must
review and approve hundreds or thousands of submitted policies each year,
an objective standard is the only practical approach to addressing readability.
125. See Root & Stableford, supra note 7, at 9 (discussing the need for
appropriate readability levels in Medicaid managed care contracts they note,
"[a]ppropriate readability does not assure a seal of approval, but without it,
nothing else matters.").
